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Abstract 
Two experiments are reported that employed think-aloud methods to test predictions 
concerning relevance effects and rationalization processes derivable from Evans’ (1996) 
heuristic-analytic theory of the selection task. Evans’ account proposes that card 
selections are triggered by relevance-determining heuristics, with analytic processing 
serving merely to rationalize heuristically-cued decisions. As such, selected cards 
should be associated with more references to both their facing and their hidden sides 
than rejected cards, which are not subjected to analytic rationalization. Experiment 1 
used a standard selection-task paradigm, with negative components permuted through 
abstract conditional rules. Support was found for all heuristic-analytic predictions. This 
evidence was shown to be robust in Experiment 2, where “select-don’t select” decisions 
were enforced for all cards. Both experiments also clarify the role played by secondary 
heuristics in cueing the consideration of hidden card values during rationalization. We 
suggest that whilst Evans’ heuristic-analytic model and Oaksford and Chater’s (e.g., 
2003) optimal data selection model can provide compelling accounts of our protocol 
findings, the mental models theory fares less well as an explanation of our full dataset.  
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Think-Aloud Protocols and the Selection Task: Evidence for Relevance Effects and 
Rationalization Processes 
The nature of human reasoning has long been of interest to cognitive psychologists. 
One task in particular continues to attract considerable research attention, namely, the 
abstract version of Wason’s four-card selection task (e.g., Wason, 1966). Although this 
task appears straightforward, few people respond with logically correct selections. In its 
most common format, participants are presented with an array of four cards, and are 
told that each card has a letter on one side and a number on the other side (only the 
facing sides are visible). Participants are then given a conditional rule that they are told 
applies to the cards, and their task is to decide which cards need to be turned over in 
order to determine whether the rule is true or false. For example, the rule might be ‘If 
there is an A on one side of the card then there is a 3 on the other side of the card’, and 
the cards might be ‘A’ ‘J’, ‘3’ and ‘7’. These are referred to as the p, not-p, q and not-q 
cards, respectively (p and not-p are antecedent cases and q and not-q are consequent 
cases). The logically correct response for a conditional reading of the rule is to turn the 
A (p) and the 7 (not-q) cards, as these could potentially provide a letter-number 
combination that would show the rule to be false. For a biconditional reading of the rule 
it would be necessary to select all four cards to check for a falsifying letter-number 
combination. Most people, however, select either A (p) alone, or A (p) and 3 (q). 
To explain these choices, Wason (e.g., Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972) suggested 
that people were displaying a verification bias, whereby they were trying to prove the 
rule true (by finding a card with the A and 3 combination), rather than trying to prove it 
false, as logic necessitates. However, Evans and Lynch (1973) demonstrated that when 
negative components are introduced into the conditional people’s selections indicate a 
systematic matching bias rather than a verification bias, in that they simply seem to 
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choose cards that are named in the given rule. Matching bias is a robust phenomenon in 
selection tasks employing abstract rules incorporating the following connectives: if p 
then q, q if p, p only if q, and there is not both p and q (e.g., Evans, Clibbens, & Rood, 
1996; Evans, Legrenzi, & Girotto, 1999). Recently, too, Roberts (2002) has 
demonstrated similar levels of matching to that seen with conditionals in selection tasks 
involving categorical rules of the form all p have q. Finally, matching has been 
observed in paradigms other than the selection task such as truth table tasks -- where 
people have either to identify or construct instances that verify, falsify, or are irrelevant 
to a given conditional or categorical rule (e.g., Evans, 1998b; Evans et al., 1999).  
Despite the apparent generality of the matching phenomenon there is some 
remaining contention as to whether it extends beyond conditional and categorical rule 
forms to rules such as inclusive disjunctions (either not p or q, or both) and exclusive 
disjunctions (either not p or q, but not both). Evidence from truth table tasks suggests 
such generality (Evans et al., 1999; Evans & Newstead, 1980), whilst evidence from 
disjunctive selection tasks is highly inconsistent: Evans et al. (1999) observed weaker 
matching effects than arise with other rule forms; Krauth and Berchtold-Neumann 
(1988) found no matching with inclusive disjunctions but an effect with exclusive 
disjunctions; and Roberts (2002) demonstrated inverted matching (i.e. reliably fewer 
matching than mismatching selections). We concur with Roberts’ (2002, p. 96) view 
that the safest inference from current findings is probably that there is no matching 
effect on disjunctive selections tasks, and that the idea that matching is a general 
linguistic phenomenon (e.g., Evans’, 1998b) is uncertain in as much as it may only 
occur for conditional and categorical statements that have an inherent directionality. 
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Theoretical Accounts of Matching Bias in the Selection Task 
Three reasoning theories of major contemporary importance have been applied to 
selection tasks involving abstract conditionals in an attempt to explain people’s choices, 
including the dominant matching pattern. Evans’ heuristic-analytic (henceforth H-A) 
theory (e.g., Evans, 1989, 1996) proposes that reasoning involves two distinct 
processing stages. First, implicit, pre-conscious, heuristics determine which aspects of a 
given task are of psychological relevance, thereby enabling attention to be selectively 
focused on these task features. Second, explicit, conscious, analytic processes are 
applied to these relevant task features in order for an inference or judgment to be made. 
Evans’ (1998b) specific account of matching bias on the selection task is that it arises 
from the operation of a linguistically-based matching heuristic, which reflects the way 
in which negative terms are used in natural language to deny suppositions rather than to 
assert new information. The essential idea is that a negative statement is a comment that 
does not alter the topic of an assertion (e.g., a statement such as “there is not a 3” is still 
about the number 3 rather than any other number)1. Evans also proposes that another 
heuristic, the if heuristic, arises in the context of conditional selection tasks, and causes 
attention to be focused on the true antecedent (TA) card for all rules. This heuristic 
explains why there is a good level of logical performance for TA cards (which should 
always be selected), and why the matching response is less marked for negated 
antecedent rules compared with affirmative antecedent ones. 
Evans’ account of selection task performance is, therefore, attentional in emphasis. 
Linguistic cues draw attention toward certain cards and away from others; the former 
get selected and the latter get rejected. Any analytic processing that is applied serves 
merely to rationalize decisions that have already been made on the basis of relevance 
(Evans, 1995). In this way, the H-A account can readily make sense of the finding 
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(Evans & Wason, 1976) that the retrospective verbal reports that people provide when 
asked to explain their card selections appear to reflect attempts to justify choices in 
terms of either verification or falsification (depending on the nature of the rule), with no 
apparent insight being displayed into the logical basis of selections. 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne’s (1991) mental models theory proposes that reasoning is 
based around the construction of models in which the premises of an argument or rule 
are represented as being true. To explain selection-task performance, this theory 
assumes that people: (1) only think about those cards that are explicitly represented in 
their models of the rule, and (2) only select those cards for which the hidden value 
could bear on the truth or falsity of the rule. So, for example, the failure to select the 
not-q card on If p then q reflects the fact that this term is not explicitly represented in 
the reasoner’s models of the conditional, thereby resulting in the common selection of 
just the p card with this affirmative rule. Those people who represent this rule as a 
biconditional would select p and q (the other dominant selection combination for an 
affirmative rule), as both of these cards are explicitly represented in models and could 
have a bearing on the rule’s truth or falsity. To account for matching bias on rules that 
contain negations, Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) argue that negated components 
promote the expansion of models to include the affirmative counterparts of negated 
terms. For example, If A then not 3 would be represented as: 
[A]    ¬ 3 
       3 
… 
In this notation, each line depicts a different model which could be true if one 
assumes the truth of the conditional. The square brackets around ‘A’ in the first model 
denote that this proposition is exhausted with respect to ¬3 (i.e., that whenever an A 
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occurs a ¬3 also occurs). The second model is incomplete in that whether or not an A 
would occur given that there is a 3 has not been represented by the reasoner. In the third 
line, the ellipses denote an “implicit” model, meaning that there may be other models 
consistent with the rule to which the reasoner has not assigned explicit content. Central 
to the mental models theory of deduction is the notion that people have limited 
working-memory capacities, and hence will represent as little as possible in their initial 
model-set to capture the meaning of the connective if. Within the model-set for If A 
then not 3, it is only the A and the 3 cards whose hidden values could bear on its truth 
or falsity if it is treated as a conditional. It is, therefore, these cards that will be selected, 
so producing a matching response pattern.  
The mental models theory of selection-task performance has some similarities to the 
H-A account (cf. Evans, 1998b). For example, the concept of explicit representation in 
models clearly overlaps with Evans’ (e.g., 1989) notion of relevance (i.e., what is 
explicitly represented in a model is what the individual perceives to be of relevance to 
the task at hand). However, the model theory differs critically from the H-A account in 
its assumption that a degree of analytic processing does determine card selections (i.e., 
the only cards that end up being chosen are those explicitly represented ones that are 
deemed to bear on the rule’s truth or falsity).  
A third theory of selection-task performance, forwarded by Oaksford and Chater 
(e.g., 1994, 1996; see also Oaksford & Chater, 2003), is framed within their general 
rational-analysis approach to human reasoning, and is referred to as the optimal data 
selection (ODS) account. Oaksford and Chater propose that selections are based on the 
information value of cards in relation to their potential support for the rule, estimated in 
the form of expected information gain. Oaksford and Chater’s mathematical analysis of 
the information value of cards shows, for example, that the selection of the matching q 
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card for the affirmative conditional can be more useful than the selection of the non-
matching (but logically appropriate) not-q card2. In this way, the ODS model proposes 
that illogical matching choices may, in fact, be deemed to be rational in terms of a 
probabilistic standard.  
The ODS theory presents a persuasive account of the matching effects observed on 
affirmative conditional rules within the selection task. Moreover, because the ODS 
theory capitalizes on Oaksford and Stenning’s (1992) arguments that negations typically 
define high-probability contrast sets, it is also readily able to explain antecedent and 
consequent matching effects observed for conditional rules containing negated 
constituents (e.g., Oaksford, 2002a; Yama, 2001). So, for example, a rule such as If 
there is an A on one side of the card then there is not a 3 on the other side is argued to 
designate a high probability true consequent category (any number that is not a 3), 
whereas the false consequent category is represented by a very low probability single 
case (the matching 3 card), whose rarity assures its high information value.  
Overall, then, the ODS account is able to accommodate a wide range of evidence for 
matching effects in the standard selection task paradigm. A final strength of the theory -
- and one which sets it apart from both the H-A and the mental models accounts -- is its 
capacity to explain the considerable body of evidence that has now been amassed for 
probabilistic influences on card selections (e.g., Green & Over, 1997; Green, Over, & 
Pyne, 1997; Kirby, 1994; Oaksford, Chater, & Grainger, 1999; Oaksford, Chater, 
Grainger & Larkin, 1997). So, for example, it has been shown that card selections vary 
in ways predicted by ODS when P(p) and P(q) are varied experimentally. Non-
probabilistic theories are generally not readily able to explain why probability 
manipulations should affect card selections, only really being able to do so by invoking 
the idea that participants adopt different task interpretations, with probabilistic 
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manipulations affecting the proportion of people adopting these different interpretations 
(see Oaksford & Wakefield, 2003).  
In spite of the capacity of the ODS theory to explain an impressive range of  
selection-task data, it has been claimed to have certain limitations. One problem (cf. 
Evans, 2002) is the difficulty that the theory appears to have in explaining why the use 
of explicit negations on cards in selection tasks completely removes matching bias (e.g., 
Evans et al., 1996). This phenomenon is easily accounted for by the H-A theory, as all 
cards present matching values within an explicit negations paradigm. Oaksford (2002a), 
however, has recently proposed that this explicit negations effect may be a result of 
participants failing to engage their “normal” interpretative processes in this task variant 
--  an explanation that is certainly worthy of further investigation.     
Tests of Theoretical Accounts of Matching Bias 
Roberts (1998b) has commented that only limited attempts have been made to test 
directly theories of selection-task performance through the production of converging 
evidence beyond actual card-selection patterns. Moreover, what effort has been made in 
this respect has primarily been driven by researchers working within the H-A 
framework. For example, Evans, Ball and Brooks (1987) used computer-presented tasks 
and recorded the order in which “select-don’t select” decisions were made about each 
card. As predicted by the H-A account, people made decisions about matching cards 
before mismatching ones, and a correlation was found between card selection frequency 
and card decision order (i.e., selected cards were decided about earlier than rejected 
ones). However, it is possible that these results simply reflect a preference for people to 
register “select” choices before “don’t select” ones, and that what is being shown is a 
response bias as opposed to an attentional bias (Evans, Newstead & Byrne, 1993; 
Roberts, 1998b). 
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Evans (1996) provided stronger evidence for the H-A account in two studies using a 
mouse-pointing methodology to record card- inspection times. Participants were 
required to tackle computer-generated selection tasks, and to indicate cards they were 
“thinking about” by holding the mouse pointer over that card. Cards were selected by 
means of a mouse-click, whilst no action was required for non-selected cards. The 
computer logged cumulative inspection times for each of the four cards on a given 
problem. Evans argued that if heuristic processes were cueing card selections, then only 
such heuristically-cued cards would be subjected to analytic rationalization processes 
aimed at justifying their selection. Inspection-times would, therefore, be higher for 
selected cards than for rejected cards. The specific predictions that Evans tested were: 
(P1) cards associated with higher selection rates will be associated with longer 
inspection times, and (P2) for a given card, participants who choose it will have longer 
inspection times than those who do not. Evans (1996) found strong support for both 
predictions. There were often sizeable differences in mean inspection times between 
selected and non-selected cards, with the former generally being greater than 4 s and the 
latter typically being less than 2 s.  
Despite this converging evidence for the H-A account of the selection task, Roberts 
(1998b) has noted a need for caution in interpreting findings that derive from Evans’ 
card-inspection paradigm. In particular, Roberts argued that there are three potential 
sources of bias inherent in this paradigm that could have led to artefactual support for 
the cla im that people are spending time rationalizing choices that have been cued by 
relevance-determining heuristics. First, participants may have a tendency to pause the 
mouse pointer over a card for a brief period of time before making an active “select” 
decis ion about it (by clicking on it). This would lead to inflated inspection times for 
selected cards relative to non-selected ones. Second, participants may forget to move 
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the mouse pointer to a new card even though their attention has shifted to this new card. 
Since people have a known preference for registering “select” decisions before “don’t-
select” decisions (Evans et al., 1987), such forgetfulness could, again, inflate the 
inspection times for selected cards (decided about earlier) than rejected cards (decided 
about later). Third, sensory leakage, where cards may be inspected (and even rejected) 
before the mouse pointer has had a chance to reach them, could also result in inflated 
times for selected over rejected cards. 
Roberts (1998b) systematically manipulated the presence of these task-format biases 
across a series of experiments, and demonstrated that the magnitude of the inspection-
time effect was closely related to the number of sources of bias present. With all sources 
removed the inspection-time effect was also eradicated. Moreover, in a unique 
deselection task -- where all cards were initially presented as selected, and participants 
clicked to deselect them -- a complete reversal of the inspection-time effect was 
observed (i.e., deselected cards were inspected for longer than those that remained 
selected). Overall, Roberts’ (1998b) results suggest that biases arising form task-format 
factors may provide at least as good an explanation of apparent inspection-time effects 
in the selection task as Evans’ H-A framework (see Evans, 1998a, and Roberts, 1998a, 
for a subsequent exchange of views on the implications of inspection-time findings for 
the H-A account).  
More recently, Ball, Lucas, Miles and Gale (2003) have critiqued inspection-time 
studies using mouse-pointing because of their use of an inherently insensitive technique 
for monitoring the second-by-second transitions in attentional processing that arise 
during selection-task performance. Of particular concern is the fact that mouse pointing 
is an indirect measure of attentional processing since participants have actively and 
effortfully to move the mouse pointer to cards that they are thinking about. Ball et al. 
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advocate the use of eye-movement tracking as a more precise approach for measuring 
moment-by-moment attentional shifts that underlie cognitive performance with highly 
display-based problems like the selection task. Ball et al. report three experiments that 
systematically eradicated the sources of artefact discussed by Roberts (1998b) by 
combining careful task constructions with eye-movement tracking to measure directly 
on- line processing. All three experiments produced good evidence for the robustness of 
the inspection-time effect, so supporting the predictions of the H-A account. 
 A recent experiment by Roberts and Newton (2001, Experiment 1) that 
encompassed a methodological innovation to improve on previous mouse-pointing 
techniques also demonstrated a reliable association between card selection and 
increased inspection times, indicating that mouse pointing measures can be sensitive to 
effects predicted by the H-A framework. Roberts and Newton (2001), however, 
presented two further studies (Experiments 2 and 3) using a rapid-response selection 
task (requiring a card decision within 2 s of its presentation) that led them to propose an 
important caveat concerning the adequacy of the H-A theory, although they remain 
broadly favourable toward this account. They note that their rapid-response tasks raised 
levels of matching for consequent cards on certain rule forms (without increasing levels 
of logical responding) in comparison with free-time tasks. This suggests that analytic 
processing arising in free-time situations may serve to overturn candidate cards cued 
through attentional heuristics (in contradiction to Evans’ H-A account, but in line with 
mental models proposals). It is possible, however, that the analytic effects that influence 
card selections identified by Roberts and Newton (2001) may be restricted to a subset of 
individuals, with a majority responding equivalently under both speeded and unspeeded 
conditions. Thus the H-A theory may capture the behaviour of most individuals, whilst 
other accounts (e.g., mental models theory) may better describe the processing of a 
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subset of individuals (see Stanovich & West, 1998, for evidence of individual 
differences in responding on the selection task).   
Despite the general support for key tenets of the H-A account of selection task that 
derive from Roberts and Newton (2001) and Ball et al. (2003), both sets of researchers 
note that the magnitude of the inspection-time effect tends to be very small. Roberts and 
Newton observed that the difference between selected and non-selected cards was 0.3 s 
after transformation, a value that maps well onto the 0.36 s difference seen by Ball et al. 
in their Experiment 3 (which arguably involved the least influence of task-format 
biases). At first sight such data seem inconsistent with Evans’ view that the inspection-
time effect is attributable to conscious rationalization processes that are applied to to-
be-selected cards with the aim of justifying heuristically-determined choices. Surely, 
analytic processes should take rather more than a fraction of a second to be applied in 
this way? Ball et al. (2003) note, however, that the idea that analytic rationalization 
should take a lengthy amount of time may be more apparent than real. In support of this 
assertion they point to research by Wason and Evans (1975) that investigated the 
justifications people provide for card selections. Wason and Evans uncovered a 
phenomenon termed secondary matching bias, which is a marked tendency for people to 
rationalize a card choice in terms of a matching value that might be present on the 
card’s reverse side. Thus, for a rule such as If there is an A on one side of the card then 
there is a 3 on the other side, participants justify why the A card should be selected by 
stating how a 3 (a matching value) on the other side would verify the rule. It is entirely 
possible that any rationalization process, whilst analytic and evaluative in intent, may, 
nevertheless, be guided by the extremely rapid, heuristic cueing of relevant information.  
Another possible account of the small inspection-time difference between selected 
and non-selected cards is that analytic rationalization processes do not actually occur at 
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all on the selection task (i.e., heuristic processing dominates all task-based activity). The 
inspection-time effect would, by this account, merely reflect the action of heuristic 
processes holding attention on relevant cards for slightly longer than irrelevant ones. As 
Ball et al. (2003) point out, however, under such an account it is unclear what kind of 
processing might be occurring during the extra period of heuristically-compelled 
attention to cards if analytic processing is believed not to be taking place. 
Verbal-Protocol Data and the Selection Task 
One approach to advancing a theoretical understanding of the processing arising 
during selection-task performance might be to obtain verbal “think-aloud” protocols 
from participants attempting such problems. The elicitation of verbal protocols from 
people engaging in problem solving and reasoning has become a respected method of 
cognitive enquiry since the publication of Ericsson and Simon’s (e.g., 1980, 1993) 
research assessing the validity of this approach. In particular, Ericsson and Simon 
(1993), having reviewed a wide body of pertinent literature, stress that the production of 
concurrent think-aloud reports can provide a highly accurate and complete index of the 
current contents of short-term memory, in that whatever is consciously attended to by a 
participant is also verbalisable. In addition, Ericsson and Simon (1993) provide 
compelling evidence indicating that retrospective reports elicited from people 
subsequent to task-based performance are problematic in terms of their validity, as they 
seem to be susceptible to biases arising from self- theorising on the part of the 
participant (cf. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  
Given that concurrent think-aloud protocols appear to be effective for tracing the 
locus of attention during cognitive task performance in reasoning contexts (cf. Evans, 
1989), it is perhaps surprising that there are few published reports that have employed 
this method in studying the selection task. Indeed some of the most recent research 
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using verbalisation methods have actually been at odds with Ericsson and Simon’s 
recommendations for the importance of eliciting concurrent rather than retrospective 
reports. So, for example, Green and Larkin (1995) utilised a post-hoc reporting 
technique, whereby participants had explicitly to provide reasons for their card 
selections when prompted by the experimenter. Such focused,  retrospective 
verbalisations may well tell us very little about the on-line focus of participants’ 
moment-by-moment attentional processing as might be gleaned from the use of a 
concurrent verbalisation method. Another recent body of selection-task research by 
Stenning and van Lambalgen’s (2002) elicited verbalisations from participants tackling 
selection tasks as part of a Socratic “tutorial dialogue” between experimenter and 
reasoner. As interesting as this methodology certainly is, we believe the technique may 
have only a limited bearing on the issue of individual reasoning processes divorced 
from the dynamics of didactic conversations between students and tutors. Indeed 
Stenning and van Lambalgen (2002, p. 281) themselves acknowledge that “Engaging 
subjects in dialogue undoubtedly changes their thoughts, and may even invoke learning. 
The relation between the reasoning processes evoked by the standard way of conducting 
the task, and the processes reflected in subsequent dialogues is a relation that remains to 
be clarified”.  
One key study of the selection task that has utilised more reliable concurrent-
reporting methods is that reported by Beattie and Baron (1988, Experiments 2 and 3). 
This research provided evidence that participants rarely mentioned alternative cards to 
the ones that they ended up selecting -- an effect that Beattie and Baron viewed as 
supporting the notion of a heuristically-based matching process. Participants were also 
seen to be overconfident about their card choices and showed little sensitivity to the 
correctness of their selections. However, Beattie and Baron’s protocol coding scheme 
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functioned at a fairly gross level of analysis that focused on the classification of 
selection patterns and the categorization of responses to probe questions. As such, their 
coding does not appear to have been geared toward uncovering insights into the 
spontaneous analytic processing that might be associated with card choices. 
A more recent protocol analysis of the selection task was presented by Evans (1995, 
Experiment 5). Protocols were analysed in two distinct ways. First, they were scored for 
references to the facing sides of cards. The percentage references were then divided 
according to whether the participant selected the card or not. Second, protocols were 
scored for references to the hidden sides of cards, and again these scores were broken 
down according to whether the card was selected or not. Consistent with Beattie and 
Baron’s (1988) findings, Evans’ first analysis revealed a significant and substantial 
tendency for participants to refer more often to the facing sides of cards that ended up 
being selected than to the facing sides of cards that ended up being rejected. 
Importantly, however, Evans’ secondary analysis revealed an identical tendency for 
participants to refer more to the hidden sides of selected cards than to the hidden sides 
of non-selected cards. Evans (1995) viewed these findings as supporting the H-A 
position that people think only about some cards and not others, and that thinking about 
hidden sides of cards mostly serves to rationalize decis ions to choose such cards. 
Experiment 1 
We are generally persuaded by Evans’ (1995) protocol-based support for the role of 
relevance effects and rationalization processes in the selection task. It is noteworthy, 
however, that Evans’ findings derive from the analysis of four distinct experimental 
conditions involving very small sample sizes (i.e., ns of 3, 3, 4, and 5). In addition, 
Evans’ tasks involved arbitrarily thematic selection-task materials (as opposed to 
abstract contents), and certain experimental conditions entailed highly non-standard 
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judgement instructions. Furthermore, Evans’ statistical analysis of his dataset using chi-
squared tests was potentially problematic in that participants contributed multiple data 
points to both the selected and non-selected cells of the contingency tables. Finally, 
Evans’ analyses did not focus on the important issue of the content of people’s 
references to potential values that may reside on the hidden sides of cards. Gaining an 
understanding of whether secondary matching bias effects (Wason & Evans, 1975) are 
associated with hidden-side references would be especially valuable for advancing an 
understanding of why the attentional processing of selected cards evidenced in 
inspection-time studies (Ball et al., 2003; Roberts & Newton, 2001) seems to be 
increased only to a small (though reliable) degree relative to non-selected cards. 
Overall, then, there would seem to be clear scope for replicating Evans’ (1995) 
protocol-based findings with an increased sample size, more conventional task features 
-- including the employment of standard abstract problems -- and traditional task 
instructions. Such a replication formed the primary aim of our first experiment. 
Crucially, too, we set out to adapt the H-A predictions that have been applied 
effectively in inspection-time studies (e.g., Ball et al., 2003; Evans, 1996; Roberts, 
1998b) so as to enable more powerful statistical tests to be pursued of the H-A theory in 
terms of people’s references to the facing and hidden sides of selected and non-selected 
cards. To this latter end we established three key predictions: 
P1 --  Cards that are associated with higher selection rates will also be associated 
with more references to their facing sides. 
P2 -- For any given card, those participants who select it will refer more to its facing 
side than those participants who do not select it.  
P3 -- For each participant, their mean number of references to the facing sides of 
selected cards should be higher than to the facing sides of non-selected cards. 
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The latter participant- level prediction is a variant of that advocated by Roberts 
(1998b) in the context of card inspection-time analyses, and is argued to be a more 
powerful test of the H-A account than either P1 or P2, which involve item-level 
analyses. It should be noted, too, that all three predictions have been stated solely in 
terms of references to the facing sides of cards. It is also possible, however, to restate 
each of these predictions so that they apply equally to the analysis of references to the 
hidden sides of cards. Such re-stated predictions would be entirely in line with the claim 
of the H-A theory (e.g., Evans 1995, 1996) that rationalization processes serve merely 
to justify card choices, thereby promoting increased references to hidden sides of 
selected cards relative to the hidden sides of non-selected ones. 
Finally we derived one further prediction from the H-A theory that pertained to the 
content of people’s explicit references to the hidden sides of cards. This prediction was 
as follows: 
P4 -- The total pool of references to hidden sides of cards should be dominated by 
references to potential matching values that might appear on the reverse sides of 
cards relative to either mismatching values or negated matching values.  
This last prediction derives from the assumption that secondary matching heuristics 
may guide the analytic rationalization processes associated with to-be-selected cards 
(Wason & Evans, 1975; Ball et al., 2003). 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 30 undergraduate volunteers from the University of 
Derby who took part in the experiment to gain course credit. Participants had not 
received any tuition on the psychology of reasoning. 
Materials and apparatus. The experiment involved selection tasks employing 
abstract conditional rules within a standard negations paradigm. Each participant 
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received four versions of the task, with negatives permuted through the conditional 
statements as shown in Table 1a (conventional terminology is used throughout the 
paper to refer to cards). Each problem was presented on a single A4 page. The rule was 
positioned at the top of the page, a reminder of the task requirement appeared in the 
middle of the page, and the pictures of the four cards were presented in the lower half of 
the page in a two-by-two arrangement. The location of cards within each array was 
always random. The experiment was carried out in an audio-recording suite to enable 
participants’ think-aloud protocols to be recorded. 
(Table 1 about here) 
Procedure.  Participants were tested individually. They were initially told about the 
essential nature of the experiment and the basic “think-aloud” requirement. To help 
clarify the expectations surrounding the think-aloud requirement and to put participants 
at their ease a brief video-based demonstration was provided of someone verbalizing 
whilst carrying out a moderately difficult problem-solving task involving the rebuilding 
of a pyramid structure using jigsaw-like building blocks. Subsequent to this 
demonstration the following written instructions were presented: 
This study is concerned with people’s logical reasoning ability and will entail you 
having to tackle a total of four problems. These problems will appear on separate 
sheets in front of you. Each problem consists of four cards and a rule that applies to 
those cards. This rule may be true or false. The cards have been constructed so that 
each one always has a letter on one side and a single-figure number on the other 
side. Naturally only one side of each card will be visible to you.  
For each problem your task is to decide which card or cards need to be turned 
over in order to discover whether or not the rule is true. It is all right for you to 
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change your mind as you work through a problem, and I will not record any 
decisions until you tell me what your final choice or choices are. 
Whilst you are reading through each problem and deciding how to solve it, 
please remember that I would like you to think aloud. As I’ve explained, you should 
find it quite natural to say aloud  whatever happens to come into your head whilst 
you are working on these tasks. If you do fall silent for any length of time, however, 
I will gently prompt you to try and keep thinking aloud. 
Once the participant had read the instructions the experimenter re-read them aloud 
and provided an opportunity for participants to seek clarification concerning any of the 
study requirements. The four problems were then presented in a random order. 
Results 
Card-selection patterns. Our first concern was to assess whether our tasks elicited 
the standard pattern of card selections observed in the literature (i.e., more matching 
than mismatching choices across antecedent and consequent cases). Matching bias was 
examined using the procedures adopted by Evans et al. (1987), summarized in Table 1b. 
An alpha level of .05 was set for all tests reported throughout this paper. Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests (one-tailed) revealed that more antecedent matching cards were 
selected than antecedent mismatching ones, p = .01, and that more consequent matching 
cards were selected than consequent mismatching ones, p < .001. This pattern of results 
is, therefore, typical of that seen for selection tasks within the negations paradigm. 
Protocol coding, reliability assessment, and normality checks. Verbal protocols 
were transcribed and then coded using three categorization systems. The first scheme 
was inspired by Evans (1995, Experiment 5) and involved examining an individual’s 
protocol and, for each rule, identifying the discrete references to the facing side of each 
card. Frequency counts for each participant’s total number of references per card were 
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then calculated in order to provide a measure for use in subsequent statistical analyses. 
It is important to note that in applying this first scheme we were cautious not to code 
any references to facing card sides that occurred when participants were making or 
confirming their final card selections. This meant that we could avoid the possibility of 
obtaining artefactual support for H-A predictions arising from the fact that only selected 
cards needed to be actively registered by participants. Any references to facing sides 
arising at the selection-registering phase would artificially inflate the frequency-count 
of mentions to selected cards, since it is only these cards that need to be referred to 
explicitly (for similar methodological concerns relating to the inspection-time effect in 
selection task studies see Roberts, 1998b, and Ball et al., 2003). In essence, our 
conservative measure of references to facing sides provides a stronger test of H-A 
predictions than the coding scheme applied by Evans (1995, Experiment 5), which 
appears not to have considered such methodological artefacts.  
Our second categorization scheme was identical to the previous one in all respects, 
except for its focus on a participant’s references to the hidden side of each card (again, 
see Evans, 1995, Experiment 5). Two coders (the authors of the present paper) 
independently applied both of the aforementioned categorization schemes to the full set 
of verbal protocols. Inter-coder reliability checks revealed a very high degree of 
consistency between coders (i.e., 97% inter-coder agreement), and there was no 
evidence of systematic divergences between coders in their categorization of discrete 
references to the facing or hidden sides of each logical case. The codes applied by the 
second author were used for all analyses associated with P1, P2 and P3. 
Our third categorization scheme involved sub-categorising each reference to a 
hidden side in terms of the specific letter or number content mentioned in that reference. 
This coding scheme used the following four sub-categories, which are illustrated in 
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terms of participants’ potential references to what might have been on the other side of 
the A card associated with an If A then 3 rule: (1) a reference to a matching item (e.g., 
mentioning the possibility of a 3 on the other side of the A card); (2) a reference to 
mismatching item (e.g., mentioning the possibility of a number such as a 7, on the other 
side of the A); (3) a reference to a negated matching item (e.g., stating that there could 
be a number that is not a 3 on the reverse of the A); and (4) a non-specific reference to 
what might be on the other side of the card (e.g., when participants stated how “It is 
important to see what’s on the other side of the A”,  without qualifying such comments 
further). It should be noted that whilst other sub-categories are possible in addition to 
the four we have described (e.g., references to negated mismatching items), our four 
sub-categories successfully captured the full range of content that we discerned in 
participants’ references to the hidden sides of cards. This third coding scheme was 
applied by the second author. As there was only limited scope for miscategorizing 
references using this scheme (i.e., the new codes simply reflected a more detailed 
breakdown of the explicit references to hidden card sides that had already been 
identified) we did not deem it necessary to pursue inter-coder reliability checks on the 
application of these codes. 
Descriptive analysis of our data revealed that they were positively skewed. Log 
transformations (subsequent to the addition of suitable constants) were found to 
stabilize variances successfully. Identical problems with skew were encountered in 
Experiment 2, and statistical analyses were, therefore, performed on log-transformed 
data throughout both experiments3. For clarity of interpretation we report means both 
before transformation and converted back into their original units after transformation.  
Analyses relating to H-A predictions. Our statistical analyses examined the four 
predictions, identified above, that derive from Evans’ (e.g., 1996) H-A account. As 
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noted previously, P1, P2 and P3 apply equivalently to the measure of references to the 
facing sides of cards and to the measure of references to the hidden sides of cards.  
Our first analysis tested P1: Cards associated with higher selection rates will be 
associated with more references to their facing (and hidden) sides. This analysis 
involved exploring the correlation across all 16 cards between the overall mean 
references to a card side and the card’s associated selection frequency (refer to Table 2). 
The correlation between the mean number of references to facing sides and card 
selection frequencies revealed a strong positive association, r = .94, N = 16, p < .001 
(transformed data). The correlation between mean references to hidden sides and 
selection frequencies was also positive and highly reliable, r = .89, N = 16, p < .001 
(transformed data).  
(Table 2 about here) 
The second analysis tested P2: For any given card, mean references to a card side 
for individuals selecting it would be higher than for those who did not select it. Mean 
references to facing and to hidden sides for each card are given in Table 3. After 
transformation, mean references to facing sides for 16 out of 16 cards were greater for 
selectors than non-selectors, p < .001, two-tailed binomial test. Likewise, after 
transformation, mean references to hidden sides for 15 out of 16 cards (one tie) were 
greater for selectors than non-selectors, p = .001, two-tailed binomial test4. 
(Table 3 about here) 
P3 tested whether, for each individual, the mean references to card sides were 
higher for selected than for non-selected cards. Two mean references to facing sides 
scores and two mean references to hidden sides scores were calculated for each person 
from the transformed data (Table 4). A within-participants analysis of variance 
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(ANOVA) provided strong support for P3 for facing sides, F(1,29) = 115.44, MSE = 
2.54, p <.001, as well as for hidden sides, F(1,29) = 106.43, MSE = 2.13, p < .001. 
 (Table 4 about here) 
We assessed secondary matching bias predictions pertaining to P4 by taking the 
total pool of references to hidden sides of cards produced by all 30 participants, and 
then computing the distribution of references within this pool across the four sub-
categories of reference-type (i.e., matching items, mismatching items, negated matching 
items, and non-specific references). This analysis revealed that the mention of matching 
values dominated people’s verbalizations concerning what might appear on the reverse 
sides of cards (64% of references) in relation to the mention of negated matching values 
(35% of references), mismatching values (< 1% of references) and unspecified values 
(< 1% of references).  
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 support predictions that can be derived from Evans’ 
(e.g., 1996) H-A account of the selection task. Overall, the analyses demonstrate that 
selected cards are associated with more attention than non-selected cards, as indexed by 
the quantity of explicit references to both their facing sides and their hidden sides. The 
finding that H-A predictions are substantiated in the analysis of references to the hidden 
sides appears to lend support to Evans’ claimed role for analytic rationalization 
processes during selection-task performance. Thus, whilst to-be-selected cards elicit 
increased consideration of what values might be on their reverse sides, such 
consideration seems to do little to change the fact that these cards tend to end up being 
selected (otherwise the link between references to hidden sides and card selection 
would be broken). One way to interpret our findings, then, is that thinking about the 
hidden sides of cards appears to have a minimal functional role in determining card 
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choices (at least for a substantial number of participants), instead mainly serving to 
confirm decisions to go ahead and choose such cards (cf. Evans, 1995, p. 168).  
The issue of what people are actually thinking about when they consider the reverse 
sides of cards has also been addressed in the present study, with some clear-cut 
findings. First, participants do not think about potential mismatching values that may 
appear on the reverse sides of cards. This may be taken as further support for the H-A 
view that people tend not to see mismatching values as having any relevance to their 
decision making during the evaluation of conditional statements. Second, the finding 
that people’s consideration of hidden values is dominated by matching possibilities 
seems to be in line with Wason and Evans’ (1975) notion that secondary matching 
heuristics may cue people’s analytic accounts as to why values on the hidden sides of 
cards justify selection of those cards. This evidence for secondary matching effects in 
abstract selection tasks also helps make sense of card inspection-time findings (e.g., 
Ball et al., 2003) that suggest analytic rationalization processes are rapid in nature. 
Rationalization might well be expected to be extremely fast if people’s justifications are 
facilitated by the heuristic cueing of “relevant” (i.e., matching) values that could appear 
on the reverse sides of cards.  
Although we believe the findings from Experiment 1 are congruent with Evans’ H-
A account of the selection task, it is possible that other contemporary theories such as 
the ODS and mental models accounts could also accommodate these results. We return 
to this pertinent issue after first presenting our Experiment 2 data.  
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 produced findings that are both in line with predictions of the H-A 
theory of the selection task, and that also converge with evidence previously obtained 
from mouse-tracking and eye-tracking studies of card inspection times (e.g., Evans, 
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1996; Ball et al., 2003) and from small-scale protocol studies reported by Evans (1995). 
In addition, Experiment 1 has clarified the important role played by secondary matching 
processes when people are referring to the hidden sides of to-be-selected cards. One 
issue that remains open to further examination, however, is the effect that enforced 
attention to cards might have on people’s heuristic and analytic processing, as measured 
by both the frequency of references to facing and hidden sides of selected and non-
selected cards, and the content of references to hidden sides. A number of researchers 
have looked at the effects of enforced attention to all four cards in abstract selection 
tasks, including Ball et al. (2003, Experiment 3), Evans et al. (1987), and Roberts 
(1998b, Experiment 3). These studies required participants to provide “select-don’t 
select” responses for all cards, and, in every case, it was found that matching-based 
responses continued to dominate selections despite the fact that normally unattended 
cards had to be responded to. Importantly, too, Ball et al. (2003) demonstrated that the 
inspection-time effect (whereby selected cards are looked at for longer than rejected 
cards) was not totally undermined by this “select-don’t select” decision requirement, 
although the effect was reduced in magnitude, presumably because rejected cards now 
become associated with at least some (enforced) consideration.   
A critical question that arises from the enforced-decision paradigm, however, is 
what, exactly, do people think about when they are compelled to inspect cards that they 
would not ordinarily attend to? In particular, do people who are making card selections 
within this paradigm think beyond the facing sides of those cards that they choose to 
reject? The H-A theory would surely still argue that people should not think about what 
might appear on the hidden sides of to-be-rejected cards. Although the enforced 
decision requirement means that people must attend to such cards in order to register 
active “don’t select” responses to them, the fact that these cards should rapidly be 
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deemed to be irrelevant means that analytic rationalization processes would not be 
called upon (cf. Evans 1998a). In other words, rationalization processes in the selection 
task (and perhaps more generally too) are assumed to be “asymmetrical”, in that people 
only pursue analytic justifications for cards that they wish to select (as cued by 
relevance), but not for cards which they wish to reject (on the basis of perceived 
irrelevance). Such avoidance of any further processing of information deemed as 
“irrelevant” certainly makes sense on the grounds of efficient information processing 
(see Evans, 1983, for further discussion of the selective nature of reasoning).  
In spite of the psychological plausibility of the arguments concerning selective 
information processing that derive from the H-A theory, it remains the case that the 
theory’s specific predictions pertaining to the enforced decision paradigm need to be 
assessed empirically. Experiment 2 was undertaken to test such predictions using the 
same selection tasks and think-aloud instructions employed in Experiment 1, except for 
the presence of enforced “select-don’t select” requirements for all cards. To test the H-
A theory we employed the equivalent predictions for both facing and hidden card sides 
as we had used in Experiment 1. Although we expected some possible weakening of 
effect sizes for the facing side predictions (P1, P2, and P3) owing to the enforced 
decision procedure, our previous inspection-time data (Ball et al., 2003, Experiment 3) 
gave us grounds for assuming that the basic finding of increased attention to selected 
cards over rejected ones should remain intact (i.e., people would give to-be-rejected 
cards only a minimal amount of explicit consideration, dwelling instead on to-be-
selected cards). As far as our predictions for the hidden sides of cards were concerned, 
we predicted effects of broadly similar magnitude to those that arose in P1 to P4 of 
Experiment 1 (i.e., participants were not expected to think about the reverse sides of to-
be-rejected cards any more than in the standard selection-task paradigm).   
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Method 
Participants. Participants were 30 undergraduate volunteers from the University of 
Derby, who obtained course credit for their involvement in the study. No participants 
had received prior tuition concerning the psychology of reasoning. 
Materials and apparatus. The selection-task materials and apparatus were identical 
to those used in Experiment 1, with the minor addition of small “yes” and “no” decision 
boxes that appeared approximately 1 cm below each card. 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, with the exception that  
instructions were modified to include reference to the presence of  “yes” and “no” 
response boxes below cards. The second paragraph of the instructions was, therefore, 
amended to read as follows: 
For each problem your task is to decide which card or cards need to be turned over 
in order to discover whether or not the rule is true. You will need to make a “turn-
don’t turn” decision about all the cards presented to you. The “yes” and “no” boxes 
underneath each card are present to remind you that you must make a “turn-don’t 
turn” decision for every card. It is all right for you to change your mind as you work 
through a problem, and I will not record any decisions until you tell me what your 
final answers are for each card. 
As in Experiment 1, once the participant had read the instructions the experimenter 
then read them aloud once more to enable any clarification to be sought concerning the 
task requirements. The four problems were presented in a random order. 
Results 
Card-selection patterns. Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests (one-tailed) revealed that more 
antecedent matching cards were selected than antecedent mismatching ones, p < .001, 
and that more consequent matching cards were selected than consequent mismatching 
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ones, p < .001. The standard matching-bias pattern is, therefore, strongly evident in the 
card-selection responses associated with this enforced decision paradigm. 
Protocol coding, reliability assessment, and normality checks. Transcribed protocols 
were coded using identical categorization and scoring schemes as had been applied in 
Experiment 1. Inter-coder reliability checks revealed a high level of consistency 
between coders in their application of the categorization schemes pertaining to 
references to facing and to hidden sides of cards (i.e., 95% inter-coder agreement). The 
codes applied by the second author were used for all subsequent analyses associated 
with the experimental predictions (P1 to P4). Similar data transformations to those used 
in Experiment 1 were employed to overcome positive skew and stabilize variances. 
Analyses relating to H-A predictions. The mean number of references to the facing 
and the hidden sides of each card, and each card’s overall selection frequency, are 
presented in Table 5. The correlations for P1 between mean references to card sides and 
selection frequencies were significant for facing sides, r = .88, N = 16, p < .001 
(transformed data), and for hidden sides, r = .94, N = 16, p < .001 (transformed data).  
(Table 5 about here) 
In relation to P2, mean references to the facing and to the hidden sides of each card 
for selectors and for non-selectors are given in Table 6. For transformed data, the 
difference between mean references to facing sides for selectors and non-selectors was 
in the expected direction for 13 of the 16 cards (two ties), which was significant with a 
binomial test, p = .021, two-tailed. The difference between mean references to hidden 
sides for selectors and non-selectors was in the expected direction for 15 out of 16 
cases, which was highly reliable with a binomial test, p = .001, two-tailed. 
(Table 6 about here) 
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To assess P3 we again undertook more powerful participant- level analyses using 
ANOVA, which revealed (see Table 7) a significant difference in the mean references 
to facing sides for participants’ selected versus non-selected cards, F(1,29) = 4.62, MSE 
= .04, p = .04, and a significant difference in the mean references to hidden sides for 
participants’ selected versus non-selected cards, F(1,29) = 8.94, MSE = .40, p = .006.  
(Table 7 about here) 
Finally, we assessed secondary matching bias predictions associated with P4 by 
calculating the distribution of all participants’ references to hidden sides across the four 
sub-categories of reference-type: matching items, mismatching items, negated matching 
items, and non-specific references. The mention of matching values dominated 
participants’ comments about what might appear on the reverse sides of cards (62% of 
references) in relation to the mention of negated matching values (33% of references), 
mismatching values and unspecified values (< 3% of references in each case). This 
distribution of references to hidden sides across these four categories is strikingly 
similar to the distribution observed in Experiment 1. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 were, again, in line with all the predictions of the H-A 
account of performance on abstract versions of the selection task. As in Experiment 1, 
people referred more to the facing and hidden sides of those cards that ended up being 
selected relative to those cards that ended up being rejected. This evidence for the H-A 
theory arises in spite of the fact that the enforced decision paradigm necessarily requires 
people to give at least some attention to cards that they might ordinarily simply ignore 
on the basis of their perceived irrelevance to the task at hand. 
Prior to undertaking Experiment 2 we had also speculated about possible shifts in 
the effect sizes for the facing and hidden side predictions (P1 to P3). More specifically, 
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we anticipated that the employment of enforced decision instructions might have some 
weakening influence on the magnitude of the effect size for the facing side predictions, 
since participants had to give some attention to all cards. On the other hand we had 
assumed that there should be no real changes in the magnitude of the effect size for the 
hidden side predictions, since participants were not expected to go on to think any more 
about the reverse sides of to-be-rejected cards even if forced to consider their facing 
sides. As it turned out, we were essentially correct in our expectations about changes to 
the effects we had observed in Experiment 1. So for example, in relation to the P2 item-
based analysis, whereas 16 out of 16 cards in Experiment 1 showed increased 
references to facing sides for selectors compared to non-selectors, this dropped slightly 
to 13 out of 16 cards in Experiment 2. In contrast, there was no such drop between 
Experiments 1 and 2 in terms of references to hidden sides for selectors compared to 
non-selectors across cards (i.e., 15 out of 15 cards showed expected differences in both 
experiments). 
A broadly similar pattern of changes to effect magnitudes was seen across 
Experiments 1 and 2 in relation to the P3 participant-based analyses. From Tables 4 and 
7 it can be seen that the mean difference in references to facing sides for selected versus 
non-selected cards dropped quite markedly from 1.02 references in Experiment 1 (i.e. 
1.26 minus 0.24) to 0.20 references in Experiment 2 (i.e., 1.08 minus 0.88), whereas the 
mean difference in references to hidden sides for selected versus non-selected cards 
dropped less strikingly from 0.66 references (i.e., 0.73 minus 0.07) in Experiment 1 to 
0.17 references (i.e., 0.34 minus 0.17) in Experiment 2. 
General Discussion 
Experiments 1 and 2 were motivated by Evans’ (e.g., 1996) H-A account of 
matching-bias effects with abstract selection tasks. This account claims that 
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preconscious, heuristic processes direct attention towards cards that appear to be 
relevant (which end up being selected) and away from ones that appear to be irrelevant 
(which are then rejected). Moreover, any conscious analytic processing that is applied 
to cards is assumed to have little functional role in determining selections, serving 
instead to rationalize decis ions that have already been made on the basis of relevance 
judgements. In our experiments we elicited concurrent verbal protocols from 
individuals tackling selection tasks in order to examine H-A predictions concerning 
what people think about when deliberating over cards. The think-aloud method is a 
valuable way to study sequential thinking activity as it is typically viewed as having the 
capacity to provide a reliable index of the locus of participants’ attentional focus during 
task performance (Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Evans, 1989). Although the think-aloud 
method may be less sensitive than other methods (e.g., eye-movement tracking) for 
monitoring the second-by-second shifts that arise in the focus of attention, a key 
advantage of the approach is that it provides an explicit trace of the content of people’s 
thoughts about those task components that have captured attention. 
Experiment 1 used a standard selection-task paradigm where active, select decisions 
were required only for cards that participants thought should be turned over to test the 
given rules. The protocol-based evidence obtained in Experiment 1 was directly in line 
with predictions derivable from the H-A theory. Participants referred reliably more 
often to the facing and the hidden sides of those cards that they selected compared with 
those that they rejected. These results substantiate Evans’ (1995) findings from a set of 
small-scale protocol studies involving low participant numbers and a variety of non-
standard instructional and contextual factors. In addition, Experiment 1 revealed new 
evidence for the role of secondary matching biases (Wason & Evans, 1975) dominating 
people’s references to the hidden sides of cards. This latter finding suggests that 
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people’s analytic processes may be supported by the rapid, secondary cueing of 
matching information. This result also clarifies why the card inspection-time data of 
Ball et al. (2000; see also Roberts & Newton, 2001) indicate that even selected cards are 
associated with quite minimal processing effort. That is, if analytic rationalization 
processes are supported by the rapid, heuristic cueing of “relevant” values that might 
arise on the reverse sides of cards, then there is no reason to expect such rationalizations 
to take more than the briefest amount of time.  
Experiment 2 employed an enforced choice selection-task paradigm to assess what 
impact placing a “select-don’t select” decision requirement on all cards might have on 
the content of people’s thinking. We know from previous research (e.g., Ball et al., 
2003, Experiment 3) that matching-bias and card- inspection-time effects remain intact 
despite such enforced decision requirements. However, the fact that Ball et al. observed 
a reduction in the magnitude of the predicted inspection-time effect suggests that 
compelling people to attend to all cards might also have a small but detectable impact 
on the effect magnitudes for H-A predictions pertaining to references to facing sides of 
cards. This was indeed seen to be the case. All facing side predictions were supported, 
but there was some evidence of reduction in the size of the observed effects. Perhaps 
more importantly, however, in the case of H-A predictions pertaining to references to 
hidden sides of cards, we expected reliable effects (as in Experiment 1), but with no 
particularly marked impact on effect magnitudes. This was because the H-A theory 
would argue that people should not think about what values might be on the hidden 
sides of to-be-rejected cards (since these are judged to be irrelevant), even if the task 
instructions necessitate that people have to attend momentarily to the facing sides of 
such cards. Again, all H-A expectations gained support from the protocol-based data 
obtained in Experiment 2, with reliable analytic-processing effects in evidence for 
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selected cards versus rejected cards, and less noticeable reductions in effect magnitudes 
for the hidden side predictions compared with the facing side predictions. 
Overall, then, we believe that we have uncovered protocol-based evidence for the 
role of relevance effects influencing both heuristic and analytic processing in abstract 
selection task performance, as predicted by Evans’ H-A theory. It is important, 
however, to consider whether other contemporary theories of the selection task are able 
to accommodate the present set of findings. Indeed, we acknowledge that our study did 
not encompass a crucial experiment that was set up to arbitrate unequivocally between 
different theoretical perspectives on the selection task. Thus it may well be that whilst 
our findings are congruent with the H-A theory that motivated our research, they may 
be similarly amenable to interpretation by one or more other contemporary selection 
task theories. 
 As we noted previously, Oaksford and Chater’s (e.g., 1994, 1996) ODS account has 
a compelling track record in terms of its capacity to explain many aspects of selection-
task performance (including the influence of probabilistic manipulations) across a 
variety of task variants. According to the ODS theory, information gain provides a 
formal measure of “relevance” (see Oaksford & Chater, 1995), and therefore ODS 
predicts the same basic pattern of matching-card selections as envisaged by the H-A 
theory. Moreover, ODS theory seems readily able to provide an alternative H-A account 
of our protocol-based findings that is distinct from Evans’ emphasis on the linguistic 
basis of matching effects (we are grateful to Oaksford, personal communication, for 
alerting us to this). So, for example, relevance assessments determined on-line by 
participants via information-gain calculations could lead to more references to matching 
versus mismatching values on facing sides. More crucially, however, ODS theory 
would also predict that in justifying their card selections participants would show 
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secondary matching because for all rules they are searching for the rare case (which is 
always the matching antecedent and matching consequent combination).  
Overall, then, the ODS model is able to capture the relevance effects that we have 
demonstrated in relation to references to both facing and hidden card sides, and, 
moreover, describes secondary matching as an analytic response (Oaksford, personal 
communication). This account also ties in selection task behaviour to rational 
explanations of biases in judgements relating to 2 by 2 contingency tables (e.g., 
Anderson & Sheu, 1995; Over & Green, 2001). One potential weakness with the ODS 
account as it is currently formulated is that it does not provide a full-blown algorithmic 
level theory specifying the specific nature, organization and time-course of the 
processing steps underpinning card selections (i.e., it is formulated at the computational 
level of what is being computed). As Oaksford (personal communication) has pointed 
out, however, most current models of the selection task (and not just the ODS theory) 
are actually highly underspecified in terms of the detailed operation sequences 
underlying reasoning, with theories tending merely to invoke a binary processing 
distinction (e.g., heuristic then analytic; initial representation then fleshing out). Indeed, 
the ODS model seems to be at least as capable as other theories of  affording an 
understanding of algorithmic level issues in the abstract selection task -- as has been 
outlined above. Nonetheless, it would be appealing to see the ODS theory developed 
further at an algorithmic level; we understand that such developments are currently 
underway (e.g., Oaksford, 2002b), and look forward to their fruition. 
The mental models account of the selection task (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1995) may 
also be able to lend itself to an explanation of some of the key findings arising in the 
present experiments. One way to formalize an analysis of mental models predictions 
concerning people’s explicit references to card sides is to compare the mean number of 
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references that people make to the sides of those cards that should be explicitly 
represented in models with the mean number of references to the sides of those cards 
that should not be explicitly represent in models. The key prediction (P5) would be that 
cards represented in mental models should be associated with more references to their 
facing and their hidden sides than cards not represented in models (see Ball et al., 2003, 
for equivalent analyses in relation to card- inspection time data).   
We tested P5 for Experiment 1 by deriving participant-based scores for mean 
references to facing sides and mean references to hidden sides (see Table 8a). Repeated 
measures ANOVAs revealed good support for P5 for references to facing sides, F(1,29) 
= 44.20, MSE = 0.56, p < .001, and references to hidden sides: F(1,29) = 35.72, MSE = 
0.53, p < .001, although it is noticeable that the effect magnitudes for P5 are less than 
those deriving from the equivalent by-participants analysis (P3) that investigated the H-
A theory. We also conducted the P5 analysis for our Experiment 2 dataset (see Table 
8b). Again, repeated measures ANOVAs revealed good support for P5 for references to 
facing sides of cards, F(1,29) = 15.88, MSE = 0.21, p < .001 and for hidden sides of 
cards, F(1,29) = 35.03, MSE = 0.90, p < .001. Unlike Experiment 1, the effect 
magnitudes associated with the test of the mental models predictions (P5) now appeared 
to be larger than those for the H-A predictions (P3). 
(Table 8 about here) 
Although it appears that the mental models theory can provide a coherent account of 
much of our protocol-based data, there remains a crucial set of evidence deriving from 
Experiments 1 and 2 that appears to arbitrate in favour of a H-A or ODS interpretation 
of performance on the selection task. This evidence concerns the finding that people’s 
references to the hidden sides of cards are dominated by the mention of matching values 
over other possible entities. This apparent asymmetry in what va lues people consider as 
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being present on the reverse sides of cards does not readily seem to emerge from the 
mental models assumption that people assess cards in terms of how their hidden values 
might impact on the truth or falsity of the presented rule. It may well be that mental 
models theorists could develop a viable account for such secondary matching effects, 
but it remains the case that these effects were directly predicted by the H-A theory.  
Our secondary matching evidence also challenge Feeney and Handley’s (e.g., 2000) 
claims to have detected a deductive component in abstract variants of the selection task 
-- a conclusion they base solely on their finding that participants consider the hidden 
sides of presented cards. However, if when considering such hidden values most people 
are simply engaging in a secondary matching process, then this would seem to be 
evidence against deduction being a key component of reasoning in the selection task5. 
The limited support for mental models predictions deriving from evidence for 
secondary-matching effects also calls into question Evans’ past proposals (e.g., Evans 
& Over, 1996, p. 136) that mental modelling may supply the analytic component to the 
H-A theory, which has always been less well specified than the heur istic component in 
this account. On balance, it would seem that either Evans’ H-A account (minus a 
mental-models analytic stage) or Oaksford and Chater’s ODS theory are most readily 
able to explain the full breadth of protocol-based evidence that we have uncovered for 
relevance effects and rationalization processes in the selection task. ODS theory may 
well have the edge on the H-A account, however, because of its impressive ability to 
explain a wide range of probabilistic influences on card-selection patterns.  
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Footnotes 
1 We note that current controversy surrounding the generality of matching bias to 
disjunctive selection tasks within the full negations paradigm (e.g., Roberts, 2002) has a 
critical bearing on Evans’ claim that the basis of matching is that the topic of a sentence 
is the same irrespective of whether or not it has been negated. More evidence is clearly 
needed to resolve this controversy and to determine whether or not the H-A theory’s 
claims regarding the origin of marching need to be qualified. 
2 Oaksford and Chater’s (e.g., 1994, 1995) analysis also entails a rarity assumption, 
which is that most properties of the world (including the properties described by p and q 
in selection task studies) apply to a small set of objects, and that people’s strategies for 
testing or framing hypotheses are, by default, adapted to situations where rarity holds 
(for supporting evidence see Anderson & Sheu, 1995; McKenzie, Ferreira, Mikkelsen, 
McDermott, & Skrable, 2001; McKenzie & Mikkelsen, 2000). 
3 In Experiment 1 a constant of 0.4 was used for both the facing-side and the 
hidden-side data transformations. In Experiment 2 a constant of 0.6 was used for the 
facing-side transformation, and one of 0.2 was used for the hidden-side transformation. 
4 One interesting observation in relation to the Experiment 1 results presented in 
Table 3 (and indeed the Experiment 2 results in Table 6) is that it seems as if more 
references are made to the facing and hidden sides of selected cards than rejected ones   
when such cards should, in fact, be rejected according to the H-A model. We note, 
however, that Evans (e.g., 1996, 1998a) has clarified that “relevance” effects can extend 
beyond cards that are cued by the matching and the if heuristics. For example, a key 
claim of Evans (1996) is that even when selection patterns are seen to vary considerably 
across different thematic contents, selections can still be interpreted as arising from 
relevance judgements. In addition, we note that it is possible that a subset of individuals 
Think-Aloud Protocols   45 
 
in our experiments were pursing full-blown and effortful logical analyses of cards (cf. 
Stanovich & West, 1998). The presence of such individuals in “selected” cells 
corresponding to infrequently selected cards could provide an alternative account of 
why more references are made to the facing and hidden sides of such cards by a 
minority of selectors relative to a majority of rejectors. 
5 We are grateful to Mike Oaksford for pointing out to us this discrepancy between 
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Table 1 
(a) The Four Types of Conditional Rule Employed in Experiments 1 and 2, Including the 
Standard Terminology that is Used to Describe Associated Cards, and (b) the Method 
Used for Assessing Matching Bias on Antecedent and Consequent Cases in Experiments 
1 and 2 
(a) Logical Case 
     Rule TA FA TC FC 
1.  If A then 3 A J 3 7 
 (p) (not-p) (q) (not-q) 
 
2.  If E then not 5 E L 2 5 
 (p) (not-p) (not-q) (q) 
 
3.  If not S then 9 D S 9 4 
 (not-p) (p) (q) (not-q) 
 
4.  If not N then not 8 T N 1 8 




One-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank comparisons for: 
(i) Matching antecedent (TA:1 + TA:2 + FA:3 + FA:4) ve rsus mismatching antecedent 
(TA:3 + TA:4 + FA:1 + FA:2), and 
(ii) Matching consequent (TC:1 + TC:3 + FC:2 + FC:4) versus mismatching 
consequent (TC:2 + TC:4 + FC:1 + FC:3)  
 
Note. TA: true antecedent; FA: false antecedent; TC: true consequent; FC: false 
consequent. Bold type indicates the elements on cards that match those in the presented 
rule. The logical combination of cards to select for each rule is TA and FC. 
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Table 2 
Percentage Frequencies of Card Selections and Overall Mean References to Facing and to Hidden Sides for Experiment 1, by Items (N = 30) 
        TA Card   FA Card   TC Card     FC Card  
     Rule  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
1.  If p then q Frequency of Selections      90.0       16.7      60.0      10.0  
 Facing Side - ND 1.37 0.85 0.57 0.94 0.90 0.71 0.53 0.90 
 Facing Side - TD 1.19  0.29  0.67  0.28  
 Hidden Side - ND 0.87 0.78 0.17 0.46 0.53 0.51 0.17 0.38 
 Hidden Side - TD 0.67  0.08  0.38  0.09  
2.  If p then not q Frequency of Selections     86.7      10.0      10.0      63.3  
 Facing Side - ND 1.53 1.14 0.37 0.67 0.37 0.67 0.80 0.85 
 Facing Side - TD 1.22  0.19  0.19  0.53  
 Hidden Side - ND 1.13 0.86 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.31 0.53 0.63 
 Hidden Side - TD 0.89  0.04  0.06  0.34  
3.  If not p then q Frequency of Selections      60.0       43.3      66.7       43.3  
 Facing Side - ND 1.30 1.29 1.07 1.08 1.17 1.26 0.90 1.27 
 Facing Side - TD 0.86  0.70  0.75  0.49  
 Hidden Side - ND 0.87 1.07 0.83 1.21 0.73 1.02 0.47 0.86 
 Hidden Side - TD 0.56  0.43  0.39  0.23  
4.  If not p then not q Frequency of Selections      60.0       46.7       33.3      53.3  
 Facing Side - ND 1.13 1.14 1.10 0.92 0.70 0.84 1.10 1.03 
 Facing Side - TD 0.75  0.78  0.43  0.75  
 Hidden Side - ND 0.47 0.86 0.60 0.72 0.20 0.41 0.63 0.72 
 Hidden Side - TD 0.25  0.38  0.11  0.39  
Mean        74.2         29.2        42.5         42.5  
Note. ND  = natural data; TD = transformed data (in original units). 
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Table 3 
Mean References to Facing and to Hidden Sides (by Items) for Selected and Non-Selected Cards, for Experiment 1 
                  Selected             Non-selected  
      Facing Hidden  Facing Hidden  
     Rule Card N ND TD ND TD N ND TD ND TD 
1.  If p then q TA 27 1.44 1.30 0.93 0.72   3 0.67 0.51 0.33 0.20 
 FA   5 1.60 1.11 0.80 0.53 25 0.36 0.19 0.04 0.02 
 TC 18 1.33 1.26 0.78 0.67 12 0.25 0.15 1.67 0.09 
 FC   3 2.00 1.64 0.67 0.51 27 0.37 0.20 0.11 0.06 
2.  If p then not q TA 26 1.54 1.34 1.12 0.89   4 1.50 0.75 1.25 0.89 
 FA   3 2.00 2.00 0.67 0.51 27 0.19 0.10 0.00   -0.01 
 TC   3 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.01 27 0.19 0.10 0.00   -0.01 
 FC 19 1.05 0.89 0.74 0.58 11 0.36 0.15 0.18 0.07 
3.  If not p then q TA 18 2.00 1.74 1.33 1.08 12 0.25 0.15 1.67 0.09 
 FA 13 1.54 1.42 1.31 0.89 17 0.71 0.32 0.47 0.20 
 TC 20 1.40 1.01 0.90 0.53 10 0.70 0.36 0.40 0.18 
 FC 13 1.62 1.15 1.08 0.75 17 0.35 0.18 0.00   -0.01 
4.  If not p then not q TA 18 1.50 1.05 0.72 0.41 12 0.58 0.38 0.08 0.05 
 FA 14 1.50 1.38 1.00 0.80 16 0.75 0.41 0.25 0.13 
 TC 10 1.20 0.92 0.40 0.26 20 0.45 0.26 0.10 0.06 
 FC 16 1.69 1.51 1.06 0.86 14 0.43 0.25 0.14 0.08 
 
Note. ND  = natural data; TD = transformed data (in original units). 
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Table 4 
Mean References to Facing and to Hidden Sides (by Participants) for Selected Versus Non-Selected Cards, for Experiment 1  
         Selected                        Non-selected  
  Facing Hidden   Facing Hidden  
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
ND:  1.52 0.51 0.98 0.49 0.46 0.49 0.16 0.26 
TD (log):  0.22 0.13 0.05 0.19     -0.19 0.22     -0.32 0.12 
TD  1.26  0.73  0.24  0.07  
 
Note. ND  = natural data; TD (log) = transformed data (in log10 units); TD = transformed data (in original units). 
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Table 5 
Percentage Frequencies of Card Selections and Overall Mean References to Facing and to Hidden Sides for Experiment 2, by Items (N = 30) 
      TA Card   FA Card   TC Card    FC Card  
     Rule  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
1.  If p then q Frequency of Selections 80.0  23.3  80.0  16.7  
 Facing Side - ND 1.57 0.82 0.93 0.74 1.43 0.77 0.90 0.71 
 Facing Side - TD 1.44  0.75  1.26  0.72  
 Hidden Side - ND 0.67 0.55 0.17 0.38 0.60 0.50 0.10 0.31 
 Hidden Side - TD 0.43  0.07  0.39  0.04  
2.  If p then not q Frequency of Selections 86.7  33.3  33.3  70.0  
 Facing Side - ND 1.87 0.90 0.83 0.70 0.93 0.83 1.37 0.81 
 Facing Side - TD 1.74  0.66  0.75  1.22  
 Hidden Side - ND 1.10 0.96 0.27 0.45 0.30 0.65 0.67 0.61 
 Hidden Side - TD 0.67  0.12  0.12  0.40  
3.  If not p then q Frequency of Selections 56.7  46.7  66.7  43.3  
 Facing Side - ND 1.43 1.33 1.30 0.95 1.40 1.10 0.77 0.57 
 Facing Side - TD 1.18  1.06  1.14  0.63  
 Hidden Side - ND 0.90 1.24 0.53 0.68 0.67 0.92 0.37 0.56 
 Hidden Side - TD 0.45  0.26  0.33  0.17  
4.  If not p then not q Frequency of Selections 56.7  50.0  40.0  50.0  
 Facing Side - ND 1.17 0.75 1.27 1.05 1.10 0.76 1.00 0.95 
 Facing Side - TD 1.02  0.99  0.95  0.72  
 Hidden Side - ND 0.50 0.57 0.60 0.62 0.33 0.55 0.53 0.68 
 Hidden Side - TD 0.27  0.34  0.15  0.26  
Mean  70.0  38.3  55.0  45.0  
Note. ND  = natural data.; TD = transformed data (in original units). 
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Table 6 
Mean References to Facing and to Hidden Sides (by Items) for Selected and Non-Selected Cards, for Experiment 2 
                    Selected            Non-selected  
      Facing Hidden  Facing Hidden  
     Rule Card N ND TD ND TD N ND TD ND TD 
1.  If p then q TA 24 1.58 1.49 0.75 0.52   6 1.50 1.31 0.33 0.16 
 FA   7 1.14 0.99 0.29 0.13 23 0.87 0.69 0.13 0.05 
 TC 24 1.50 1.40 0.71 0.51   6 1.17 0.95 0.17 0.07 
 FC   5 1.40 1.35 0.20 0.09 25 0.80 0.63 0.08 0.03 
2.  If p then not q TA 26 1.81 1.64 1.12 0.67   4 2.25 2.09 1.00 0.69 
 FA 10 1.20 1.10 0.50 0.29 20 0.65 0.47 0.15 0.06 
 TC 10 1.30 1.10 0.80 0.45 20 0.75 0.60 0.05 0.02 
 FC 21 1.48 1.31 0.81 0.45   9 1.11 0.99 0.33 0.16 
3.  If not p then q TA 17 1.29 1.22 0.76 0.48 13 1.62 1.10 1.07 0.39 
 FA 14 1.36 1.14 0.71 0.40 16 1.25 0.95 0.38 0.16 
 TC 20 1.35 1.22 0.60 0.39 10 1.50 0.99 0.80 0.23 
 FC 13 0.77 0.63 0.39 0.20 17 0.77 0.63 0.35 0.15 
4.  If not p then not q TA 17 1.17 1.31 0.71 0.46 13 0.85 0.69 0.23 0.10 
 FA 15 1.53 1.35 0.87 0.61 15 1.00 0.66 0.33 0.16 
 TC 12 1.17 1.14 0.58 0.31 18 1.06 0.81 0.17 0.07 
 FC 15 0.93 0.72 0.67 0.36 15 1.07 0.72 0.40 0.18 
 
Note. ND  = natural data.; TD = transformed data (in original units). 
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Table 7 






Note. ND  = natural data; TD (log) = transformed data (in log10 units); TD = transformed data (in original units). 
     Selected                        Non-selected  
           Facing            Hidden          Facing  Hidden  
 Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
ND:  1.33 0.47 0.67 0.47 1.10 0.48 0.37 0.27 
TD (log):  0.23 0.12 -0.27 0.25 0.17 0.14 -0.43 0.20 
TD  1.08  0.34  0.88  0.17  
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Table 8 
Mean References to Facing and to Hidden Sides (by Participants) for Cards Represented in Mental Models Versus Cards Not 










Note. ND  = natural data; TD (log) = transformed data (in log10 units); TD = transformed data (in original units). 
 
(a)       Represented in Mental Models          Not Represented in Mental Models  
           Facing            Hidden          Facing  Hidden  
 Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
ND:  1.04 0.56 0.63 0.45 0.59 0.59 0.22 0.35 
TD (log):  0.04 0.18 -0.11 0.18 -0.15 0.23 -0.30 0.15 
TD  0.70  0.38  0.30  0.10  
(b)       Represented in Mental Models          Not Represented in Mental Models  
           Facing            Hidden          Facing  Hidden  
 Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
ND:  1.32 0.51 0.62 0.36 0.86 0.52 0.23 0.27 
TD (log):  0.23 0.12 -0.28 0.21 0.11 0.17 -0.53 0.20 
TD  1.08  0.30  0.68  0.10  
